


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The Insider



Moyers to Carter to Turner: The President hated the show

Your show of shows

President Carter (along with millions of us) watched Bill Moyers's CBS report on the CIA June 10. After watching nearly an hour of outrages, President Carter (like millions of us) was furious. Unlike millions of us, however, President Carter picked up his phone and called Stansfield Turner, the head of the CIA, and asked him whether he too had seen the Moyers

show. Turner hadn't; Carter ordered him to get a tape of the show, watch it, find out whether the documentary's allegations were true. If they had been, Carter told his chief intelligence officer, he wanted to know. Under any circumstances, he wanted a complete report. And if the CIA was still behaving as it had been, President Carter wanted to know, and he wanted it stopped.

The Yom Kippur War: Did we encourage the ambush?

In writing his CIA novel, *Orchids for Mother*, Aaron Latham came across information that led him to believe that American intelligence had advance knowledge of the Arab plan to launch a surprise attack on Israel in October, 1973. "Two days before the Arabs' surprise attack," Latham says, "Secretary of State Kissinger met with

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban and told him, 'Nothing dramatic can happen in October.'"

Kissinger was, according to many sources, consumed with a fear that an intemperate Israel would deliver a devastating first-strike, capable of permanently upsetting the balance of power.



Latham was later able to see the CIA's secret "Post-Mortem Report" that asserted: "There was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East." "Why," Latham asks, "the italics? Why so defensive? Was this an answer to intra-agency critics who said there was *not* an intelligence failure? That the CIA had known all along?" The "Post Mortem" goes on to state: "Community analysts were provided with a plenitude of information which should have suggested, at a minimum, that they take very seriously the threat of war in the near term. . . . Instead of warnings, the Community's analytical effort in effect produced reassurances. That is to say, the analysts . . . sought in effect to reassure their audience that the Arabs would not resort to war."

Latham's theory: We knew but didn't want to know. We wanted to keep the Israelis from striking first. It was the Arabs' turn.